Kleptographic Weaknesses of Benaloh-Tuistra Protocol

P.Borzecki, J.Kabarowski, P.Kubiak, M.Kutylowski, F.Zagorski



In cryptographic protocols designed nowadays
participants are usually identified by software
or hardware they use. However,  the work of these
supporting tools is not verified at the protocol level.
Such carelessness opens the door to kleptographic 
(SETUP) attacks.
In this paper we maintain a kleptographic attack
on the well known Benaloh-Tuinstra electronic election protocol. 

We also present a new variant of a Diffie-Hellman SETUP
attack, in which Kronecker Decomposition of the group
is not known to the attacker. This is especially the case
of Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem.