# Adversary Immune Size Approximation of Single-Hop Radio Networks

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# Single-Hop Radio Network



A network consists of a number of stations communicating via a radio channel. 

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possible status of a station:

#### dead

inactive its transmitter and receiver are switched off, internal work only active sending xor monitoring the channel (not necessarily getting a message)

number of stations, status of a station – unpredictable

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## Single-hop Radio Network



State of a network from an algorithmic point of view.

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- communication via a shared broadcast channel
- a signal from a station can reach everybody -single-hop
- one cannot simultaneously transmit and listen

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- communication via a shared broadcast channel
- a signal from a station can reach everybody -single-hop
- one cannot simultaneously transmit and listen
- if two stations send then collision no message comes through
- common clock, synchronous communication, discrete time steps

- no central control,
- initially a station knows only about itself, no knowledge on existance of other stations,
- the stations may have some preloaded shared knowledge (secret keys ...)

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often said:

- no central control, so resistant against failures and attacks
- dynamically adopting

### but the truth is:

we are used to work with algorithms for:

- Iow dynamic systems
- reliable communication
- not many "bad guys" in the system
- unproblematic initialization

here the situation is completely different

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### Start situation::

- each station knows only about itself and the algorithm executed
- Goal:
  - build a logical infrastructure so that we can run algorithms on this basis.

It is like "booting" ad hoc networks.

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One of the very basic problems to solve:

find a number N such that

 $n/c \le N \le c \cdot n$ 

where n is the (unknown) number of the stations

#### time - the number of time slots used by the algorithm

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energy cost - the maximal *k* such that some station transmits/listens *k* times during algorithm execution

- communication consumes almost all energy used (processor and sensors usage negligible)
- energy required for transmitting and listening of the same magnitude

- random transmission errors,
- or burst errors,
- or even a malicious adversary knowing the algorithm

 legitimate stations share a secret that is not known by the adversary

 $\Rightarrow$  keyed MAC can be used to prevent faking messages by an adversary

- an adversary may attempt to cause collisions so that the algorithm fails
- the adversary cannot use much higher communication resources than the other stations

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Suppose we have *K* stations.

A step:

a station decides to transmit a message with probability p, then probability that exactly one station transmits equals

$$K \cdot p \cdot (1-p)^{K-1}$$

- ► the probability maximized for p = 1/K, the value achieved is  $\approx 1/e$
- the probability  $\approx$  0, if *p* is not close to 1/K.

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Steps executed:

for probabilities

$$p = \dots, 2^{-i}, 2^{-(i+1)}, 2^{-(i+2)}, \dots$$

until a single message sent

(for each probability some number of trials takes place)

then 1/p taken as an approximation of the number of stations

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#### Attack

the adversary sends junk messages when probability p is close to  $1/{\it K}$ 

### then the algorithm will never terminate

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## Main Result

- energy cost  $O(\log \log N \cdot \sqrt{\log N})$
- time complexity  $O(\log^{2.5} N \cdot \log \log N)$
- outcome correct with probability  $\geq 1 2^{-z}$  where  $z = \Omega(\sqrt{\log N})$  for an adversary with energy cost  $O(\log N)$
- ► the same (correct) answer known to all stations except o(N/2<sup>√log N</sup>) of them.

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Best fragile algorithm (Jurdziński, K., Zatopiański, COCOON'2002): runtime  $O(\log^{2+\epsilon} n)$ , energy cost  $O((\log \log n)^{\epsilon})$  for any  $\epsilon > 0$ 

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- within a group of k time slots only one really used by the algorithm
- which slot is used depends on a secret unknown to the adversary
- For an adversary it is difficult to make a collision at the right moment!
- but waste of communication time



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# Interleaving Time Windows

A technique used when groups of stations perform independent computations in parallel:

- ► a time window of length *k* used simultaneously by *k* groups
- for communication in window t, group i uses slot

*f*(secret, *t*;*i*)

f(secret, t; -) - a cryptographic pseudorandom permutation



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### Advantages:

- each time slot used
- behaviour from a point of view of a group the same as for time windows
- an adversary cannot attack a single group the attack goes against all groups with less collisions for each group

### General strategy:

- perform the basic algorithm in many groups independently
- in a group try different probabilities
- the number of groups is too large to allow an adversary disturb all of them



# Algorithm Idea -

#### Sucesses:

- single transmissions for about the same probabilities
- take some median
- one cannot listen all the time due to energy cost



### Experiment for a single group and a single probability:

- 8 trials
- success if a message exactly 3 times came through

success in a single experiment



### Dissemination of information:

- gossiping
- even if two stations do not have the same view, it is likely that the median probability is the same

## Thanks for your attention

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