A Practical Voting Scheme with Receipts

   Marek Klonowski, Miroslaw Kutylowski, Anna Lauks, Filip Zagorski


Chaum introduced Visual Voting scheme in which a voter obtains  a  paper
receipt  from  a voting machine. This receipt can be used to verify that
his vote was counted in the final tally, but cannot  be  used  for  vote
selling.   The   Chaum's  system  requires  sophisticated  printers  and
application of randomized partial checking (RPC)  method.  RPC  provides
provable anonymity and for good information hiding requires O(1) step of
protocol executed by different tallying authorities. Unfortunately  this
constant  is  quite  high  quite  so quite many tallying authorities are
required.

We  propose  a  complete  design  of  a  voting  system  that  preserves
advantages  of  the  Chaum's  scheme,  but eliminates the use of special
printers and RPC. It seems that in our protocol it is  easier  then  for
any  other  election  scheme  to convince an average voter that a voting
machine does not cheat and that his vote has been counted in  the  final
tally.