copyright: Mirosław Kutyłowski, Politechnika Wrocławska

# Security and Cryptography 2021 Mirosław Kutyłowski

# V. PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS

Idea: create a device that has a unique unclonable properties.

Applications: authentication, key generation

# Early designs- unclonable fingerprints

- nuclear missiles marking them so that copying the fingerprints is impossible, some kind
  of spray used
- optical PUFs: a 1mm material with a large number of randomly positioned 100-m silica spheres suspended in a hardened epoxy
  - → laser beam directed at a given place with a given polarization
  - → reflection depends on spheres encountered by the beam
  - → it is practically impossible to reconstruct the same structre of the material

## Weak PUFs

- small number of responses
- output of a PUF is a short sequence of bits

## application -key generation

- secret key is not stored on a device but it is reconstructed on demand
- advantage: no tamper protection needed (lower price), no leakage from the permanent storage

## problems

- errors during reconstruction due to physical noise,
- bias of bits
- active attacks (e.g. with a laser beam to change the state of a CMOS circuit implementing PUF)

# **Strong PUFs**

- a big number of CRP (challenge-response pairs)
- outputs for different challenges are almost uncorrelated

## application - authentication


- CRPs read from the device and stored on a server
- each pair used at most once
- advantage: no crypto on the device, lightweight

## problems

- errors during reconstruction due to physical noise,
- reconstruction of the model (without creating a physical copy)
- active attacks

## **SRAM PUF**

- at power-up both states (0 and 1) are possible
- which one will prevail depends on a random processes, in practice: bias towards 1
- attacks: keep a given value for 10 hours, after the next power-up bias towards the other bit




(picture from Heder et al.: Physical unclonable Functions and applications)

## advantages and disadvantages:

- low price, low area
- high error rate,
- error correction codes applied, but keeping syndrome codes themselves are leaking inforamtion

# **Strong PUFs**


similar solution based on bistable latches composed of 2 NAND gates:



#### SR Latch:

- notation: reset=a, outputs from gates: b, c
- initially: a=0, b=c=1
- change a to 1, then
  - b=1, c=0 if lower gate faster
  - − b=0, c=1, if upper gate faster


# **Ring Oscilators**



(fig. from cryptostack exchange)

- each oscilator has a different speed
- ordering the speeds is the output secret of the PUF
- problem: if frequences are almost the same then noise becomes important

# **Arbiter PUF**



(picture from Heder et al.: Physical unclonable Functions and applications)

 $- \ \ \mathsf{input} \ X \ \mathsf{determines} \ \mathsf{the} \ \mathsf{paths}$ 

## **Arbiter PUF**

#### **Problems**

- delays on each edge determine behavior
- modelling by linear equations,
- each experiment yields 2 equations
- linear algebra problem, easy to solve

#### **Countermeasures**

- combine a number of Arbiter PUFs with XOR (cascade of XOR gates)
- other non-linearity

### **Further Problems**

- machine learning attacks very effective, XOR makes them less effective (time increases exponentially with the number of XOR gates
- ML + side channel information Arbiter PUF easy to break even if many XOR gates

#### Model based PUF

- instead of holding CRP in a (protected) database ...
- make the model for a PUF public (e.g. delays for Arbiter PUF)

#### idea for authentication

- 1. the server creates a challenge x
- 2. the PUF rapidly computes f(x) thanks to hardware
- 3. the server receives the answer and recomputes f(x) (tedious and long computation)

#### **Problem:**

#### find a PUF that:

- is fast on hardware
- cannot be cloned
- software computation is unproportionally long on any reasonable machine\*

<sup>\*</sup>reasonable = regarding the price with respect to the profit

# Patent problems

killing the idea through legal threats available on some hardware platforms