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Security and Cryptography 2022 Mirosław Kutyłowski VIII. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY

as there are problems to guarantee security of devices in the traditional way, maybe there is a way out using physics? three directions:

1) quantum based random number generators


2) key transport

3) quantum cryptanalysis

- TWINKLE 2TWIRLE
- hypothetical computer Weizmann Inst.

RSA nathices, huge

look for a natrix that is not sparse



Qubit concept

• instead of a bit with discrete states 0 and 1 we have a linear combination of basis vectors denoted by $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$:

 $\alpha \cdot |0\rangle + \beta \cdot |1\rangle$

with α , β complex numbers such that $|\alpha|^2 + |\beta|^2 = 1$

- a measurement of $\alpha \cdot |0\rangle + \beta \cdot |1\rangle$ yields $|0\rangle$ with pbb $|\alpha|^2$ and $|1\rangle$ with pbb $|\beta|^2$ • measurement may be performed only for an **orthogonal basis**.
- The basis can be different from $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$. E.g.:

 $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle) \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle)$

Measuring qubits

fundamental property:

measuring $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)$ for basis $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$ yields both 0 and 1 with probability 0.5

 $(\frac{1}{2})^2 = \frac{1}{2}$

• this seems to be a perfect source of random bits:

A generate fotons $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)$

2 measure them in basis $|0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle$

- moreover: reading changes the state to the state read:
 - if the result is $|0\rangle$, then the physical state becomes $|0\rangle$ as well,
 - if the result is $|1\rangle$, then the physical state becomes $|1\rangle$ as well,
 - there is no state $\alpha \cdot |0\rangle + \beta \cdot |1\rangle$ anymore.
- In fact, this is the core of Shor'a algorithm a reading operation creates a change in a physical system that would be infeasible to compute on a classical computer
- instead of a single bit we may have strings of qubits, say of length l where l > n


Random Number Generators

Problems:

- high price
- while physical source might be ok, reading circuit introduces high bias, very poor results (2017) in the standard randomness tests for devices available on the market
- bias can be removed via additional logic, but extra hardware may mean place for Trojans and the whole advantage is gone
 - quantum hacking attacks on the physical level?

Quantum key transport, BB84

- Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard, 1984, 1st quantum protocol, even implemented
 - key agreement immune to eavsdropping (reading qubits is detectable)
- two bases used:




() () +たい) 0/in X Read read 0: ppb 0.5 Ppb 0.5 1 Basis X: read O: ppb 1 read 1: 6 0 29g

Steps:

- 1. Alice chooses at random bitstrings a and b of length n
- 2. for $i \le n$ Alice encodes a_i according to basis indicated by b_i (0 indictes +, 1 indicates \times)

3. Alice sends n photons (codes for a)




- 4. Bob chooses at random string \hat{b} of n bits,
- 5. For the *i*th photon, Bob measures the photons using the basis indicated by b_i
- 6. Alice sends b to Bob over a traditional (public) channel, Bob sends \hat{b} to Alice

7. Alice and Bob take the substring K of bits a_i such that $b_i = b_i$

- 8. Alice chooses a subset of 50% of bits of K and discloses them to Bob
- 9. Bob checks how many of them disagree with his measurement. If above some threshold then it is likely that an adversary has measured the transmission as well and the protocol is aborted (environment may also create inconsistencies)
- 10. the unpublished substring of K may differ between Alice and Bob: an error correcting procedure applied (error correction attracts the bitstrings to the closest codewords, so if the strings of Alice and Bob differ slightly, then they result in the same codeword)
- 11. "privacy amplification": hashing to a much shorter string


 $b_i = \hat{b}_i$ $\wedge)$





Bob learns ai

Bob learns roudon ortput





the sace trouble I

effect of eavesdropping:

- assume that Alice chooses basis \times to encode 0,
- eavesdropper Eve chooses a different basis for the measurement: namely +
- Eve gets $|0\rangle$ with pbb .5 and $|1\rangle$ with pbb .5, say $|0\rangle$ has been obtained
- at the same time the photon converted to $|0\rangle$ (important!)
- Bob measures the photon according to the basis $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle), \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle |1\rangle)$
- $|0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle + |1\rangle) + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle |1\rangle) \right)$, so both results of the measurements (i.e $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle + |1\rangle)$ or $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle |1\rangle)$ are equally probably for Bob, so the measurement of Bob indicates 1 with pbb .5
- corollary: eavesdropping creates inconsistency between Alice and Bob with pbb .5 once
 Eve chooses a different basis than Alice and Bob ⇒ this is why 50% of agreed bits

have to be checked

quantum hacking: in theory the algorithm is wonderful, but the problems come with physical realization

 \rightarrow sending many photons to Bob at the time when his hardware already set for a measurement. Reflected photons show the basis used

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Eckert algorithm:

- entangled pair of photons: measurement of one of them makes the mirror change of the other photon
- procedure:
 - 1. generate entangled qubits $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)$ by some source

2. measure them by Alice and Bob on both ends of the channel

Properties:

- long distance transmissions possible, even to a moving airplane, satellite, etc
- over optical fibre or in free space (vacuum better)
- 1203 km between ground stations over satelite (China)
- both BB84 and Eckert can be used
- high price
- does not solve man-in-the-middle issue

