Wrocław University of Technology, WPPT

## CRYPTOGRAPHY AND SECURITY, 2011 Assignments, list # 5

- 1. Why Rabin-Miller test provides correct results in the sense that for **each** tested composite number *n* probability of answering "prime" is lower than one (so it does not fail like Fermat test).
- 2. Assume that there is a test A which for a given RSA ciphertext c created for an RSA number n says if the plaintext of c is smaller than n/2. Construct an attack which recovers the plaintext of a given ciphertext c. The attack may use A as a subprocedure.
- 3. Compare complexity of generating a pair of RSA keys of length 1024 bits and of 2048 bits.
- 4. One of ID-based signatures is based on a bilinear mapping  $e: G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$  in the following way:
  - A trusted authority TA has a master secret t and a public key  $Q_{TA}$  where  $Q_{TA} = tP$  for a generator P.
  - A user A gets from TA a secret S(A) = tH(A), where H is a hash function mapping into  $G_1$ .
  - In order to sign a message m user A chooses  $P_1 \in G_1$  at random, as well as an integer k and computes:
    - $r = e(P_1, P)^k,$
    - v = h(m, r), for a hash function h,
    - $U = vS(a) + kP_1.$

Finally (U, v) is a signature for m.

Find a verification test for such signatures.

- 5. Show that if there is a bilinear mapping  $e: G_1 \times G_1 \to G_2$ , then Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is not hard in  $G_1$ .
- 6. Is it possible to run Shamir no key protocol after replacing prime number p with an RSA number?
- 7. Recall the game used to define Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption. In a similar way define security of a commitment scheme.
- 8. One of the ideas to prevent a man-in-the-middle attack is the interlock protocol in which during a single round each side sends only a half of a ciphertext and then awaits a half of a ciphertext from the other side. Propose details of the protocol and show that it is really immune against man-in-the-middle attack.
- 9. Formalize the property of secret sharing (n, k) saying that "less than k users cannot derive any information about the secret".
- 10. Design a secret sharing scheme in a group of 5 men and 5 women. The secret should be recovered by each coalition of x men and y women such that x + 2y > 6.

/-/ Mirosław Kutyłowski